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A Complete Atheist
Jean Meslier’s Political Philosophy
Charles Devellennes *
Jean Meslier, a largely forgotten figure of the history of political thought, is a
radical thinker of the Enlightenment, and one who best illustrates Israel’s thesis
about the period. This article, which proposes to set Meslier’s work in his intellec-
tual context, will show just how radical this Catholic priest really was. It details
the intellectual journey in Meslier’s works leading to the affirmation of his own
atheism and shows how this atheism then sets the stage for the development of a
proto-utilitarian doctrine.This doctrine then has consequences for political thought
more widely. Against the dominant reading in the literature, which portrays Mes-
lier as an early communist thinker, this article shows that he is best understood as
a radical republican thinker. This further helps nuance the Israel’s Enlightenment
thesis, by showing how republicanism (as opposed to a theory of ‘democracy’) is a
better fit for the works of some radical thinkers of the period.
1. Introduction
The question of what constitutes the Enlightenment has been a conundrum
for philosophers and historians alike at least since the 18ᵗʰ century.¹ Jonathan
Israel’s trilogy (Israel 2001; 2006; 2012), which aims to situate a radical Enlight-
enment which is at the origin of modern political culture has brought a recent
* University of Kent (c.devellennes @ kent.ac.uk).
¹ Kant’s ([1784] 1991) famous essay “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” pro-
vides a self-reflective account of the Enlightenment on itself. Yet as Gay (1966, 103) notes, there
is a form of self-consciousness that spans the entire Enlightenment period. ‘We’ do not call these
thinkers enlightened, they did. Whether it is called the siècle des lumières, the Aufklärung or the En-
lightenment; these are not labels imposed by their contemporary critics or present-day historians,
these are terms used by the philosophes themselves as a description of their own activity.
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controversial turn within this debate. Reviving Peter Gay’s modernisation the-
sis (1966), Israel wishes to uncover the origins of the principles of universality,
equality, and democracy that we hold as our own today. Starting with Spinoza,
Israel (2001) identifies a tradition that challenges the privileges of the aristoc-
racy and the clergy, a movement which matures into the late Enlightenment
philosophy of Holbach and Diderot. Israel’s critics, even those who are sympa-
thetic to his aims, have shown the limitations of such an approach (Kors 2003;
La Vopa 2009; de Dijn 2012). Israel’s work, in particular, is conceived as too
generalising, and does not sufficiently accommodate for the radical nature of
Hobbes’, Hume’s, or Boulanger’s works. Yet Israel’s thesis is perhaps nowhere
better supported than in the work of Jean Meslier, as I will demonstrate in this
article. Meslier, Israel points out, is a materialist thinker who can be properly
labelled as one of the Spinozistes modernes (Israel 2006, 49). The radical nature
of his atheistic thought, as I will show, is even more potent than Israel points
out. His political theory, grounded in a universalist defence of equality, along
with his radical republicanism, certainly fits the model of the radicals that Is-
rael portrays in his work. Where Israel comes short is not so much that he has
exaggerated the radical nature of Meslier’s thought, but rather than he has un-
derplayed it. Meslier’s flirtations with extreme left ideas may prove too radical
for Israel’s rather liberal conception of radicalism in the Enlightenment.
Meslier, despite an excellent critical edition of his works in French (Mes-
lier 1970) and a recent English translation of his Memoir (Meslier 2009), is lit-
tle known outside specialist Enlightenment scholarship, though his critique
of religion had raised some attention in atheist circles. Meslier’s context is
more firmly anchored in a Cartesian framework than Israel’s Spinozist hypoth-
esis allows for, hence Meslier’s failure to fully separate his thought from that
of Descartes, Fénelon, and Malebranche will be explained. It is furthermore
through a utilitarian critique thatMeslier attempts to ground his political thought
and led to his attempt to link his religious critique with a political critique. Fi-
nally, I will show that French reception of Meslier’s work from the 1960s on-
wards has been centred on the ‘communist hypothesis’, and that the extreme
left wing of the radical Enlightenment may prove too radical for Israel himself.
2 : 2 Charles Devellennes
2. Anti­religious thought
Meslier’s anti-religious thoughtwaswidely known in the 18ᵗʰ century. Voltaire,
despite his drastic editorial judgments, did have the merit of popularising the
first five proofs of the curé’s work. Meslier’s arguments against religion are di-
verse and varied but can be categorised and simplified. There are hermeneutic
arguments based on a close reading of the Bible, logical arguments based on in-
consistency with the Bible or between the Bible and the subsequent Christian
traditions. Broadly speaking, these arguments can be seen to aim at introducing
doubt and scepticism in the reader’s mind, as Benítez (2011) notes. If there are
inconsistencies in the Holy texts and in doctrine, its claims to perfection grow
thinner, andMeslier’s attempt at persuasion must be put in his Catholic context.
They also aim to place Christianity on a par with other religions. If one is dismis-
sive of most religious traditions practiced in the world, what evidence is there
to sustain such a dismissal? Or better still, why not reject all religions if none
of them have sufficient proofs in their favour? Alongside these arguments is an
attempt to historicise Christianity. The historical method contextualises Chris-
tianity, showing that it shares more than it admits with prior religions and is
relatively insignificant given the vast differences in religious beliefs throughout
the ages (Morehouse 1936, 2). And the history of Christianity is not more accom-
modating of claims to divine inspiration, as Meslier (2009, 114) notes the late
decision that constituted the Holy texts (at the council of Carthage in 397CE).
The selection of the Holy texts being contingent on human decisions, helps to
shed doubt on the claims of the Church. Taken together, these arguments pose
important questions for Meslier. Why do we still follow Christian teaching if
they can no longer sustain a claim to universal truth? Why not get inspired
by other traditions since Christianity is just as contingent? At the very least,
Christianity and religious teaching in general are on a par with other attempts
to understand the world, including non-religious philosophies.
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Alongside these hermeneutic, logical, and historical arguments in Meslier’s
proofs, there are a plethora of political arguments. These further radicalise the
contextualisation of the previously mentioned arguments. Essentially, Meslier’s
claim is that religious belief, and Christian belief in particular, has a negative ef-
fect on politics. From the very beginning of hisMemoir, Meslier is adamant that
religion and politics are intimately intertwined. How else could one explain the
survival of false beliefs throughout the ages? It is because of an alliance between
the political rulers and the priests—who have a vested interest in maintaining
their privileged positions, that Meslier perceives the origin and continuation of
religion. Pagan religions as well as the monotheistic ones exhibit signs of these
kleptocratic tendencies. There has been, and still is, for Meslier, a conspiracy
of prince and priest. One of his most notorious sentences, which was taken up
by Diderot much later in his poem Les Eleuthéromanes (Pellerin 2003), is worth
quoting. “I remember the wish of a man a while back who had no culture or
education, but who, to all appearances, did not lack the common sense to pass
sound judgments on all these detestable abuses and tyrannies. (…) His wish was
that all the rulers of the earth and all the nobles be hanged and strangled with
the guts of priests” (Meslier 2009, 37).
This collusion of rulers and priests is blameworthy, but not exactly in the
manner advocated by this man of no culture or education. For Meslier (2009,
38) would prefer to “have the arm, strength, courage, and body of Hercules to
purge the world of all vices and iniquities”. It is gross inequalities that are being
attacked here. Continuing with Israel’s thesis of the Radical Enlightenment, Mes-
lier was largely concerned with the political consequences of religion. At least
in theory, a benign religion would not have attracted his wrath. Meslier’s fond-
ness the social role of the lower clergy and for the organization of the monastic
orders testifies to this possibility. However, in practice, all existing religions
are critiqued together for their shortcomings. It is even more troubling that re-
ligions, which should have offered relief from the abuses of political power and
stood up for the people against tyrants, have so often collaborated with their
abuses.
Meslier’s strongest critique of religion is surely his moral reversal of Chris-
tianity. As is evident from the works of Bayle, the critical issue at the turn of
the 17ᵗʰ century was whether atheists could be trusted to be moral persons,
or indeed whether they could be trusted at all. Bayle had already challenged
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this conception, by showing that belief (or lack thereof) in an afterlife had lit-
tle to do with moral behavior (Bayle [1683] 1994, §§ 131 and 136; [1740] 1995,
artt. Knuzen and Spinoza; Schröder 2004). Meslier accepts this argument even
though his knowledge of Bayle’s work is most likely second-hand, as he was
keen to use this insight to his advantage.The unorthodox believer, or the atheist,
is perfectly capable of moral behavior founded in social utility. But Meslier does
not stop here and pushes the argument much further than Bayle had. If it is true
that the atheist is immune to arguments in favor of ethical behavior founded in
an afterlife, Meslier argues, it is also true that religion has provided many sec-
tarian arguments in favor of persecution of unorthodox thinkers, heretics, be-
lievers of other religions, and atheists. Against the potential benefits for morals
of believing in an afterlife, Meslier retorts that religious beliefs have provided
many detrimental effects in the here-and-now. The question of the possibility
of a virtuous atheist is thus turned around on its head by Meslier: is it possible
to have a virtuous believer? Meslier’s rhetoric does not go so far as to deny eth-
ical behaviour from believers though. Many believers have also been virtuous
people, and there is little doubt that those who are immune to the most doc-
trinal and superstitious elements of religious belief are capable of promoting
social virtue. But religious belief has the potential for danger, especially when
education is monopolised by priests. The central reversal, from Bayle’s thought
to Meslier’s, is on the role that faith plays (Logins 2012; McKenna 2001). For
Bayle, faith in the Scriptures had been a fallback position in the face of un-
certainty raised by skepticism. For Meslier (2009, 72), however, faith is “blind
belief” and justifies moral discrimination on those of a different faith. In the
first instance, it leads to ignorance through refusal to engage with facts that
contradict one’s faith; and in the second it leads to sectarian attitudes. Since
Meslier rests his morals in social utility, faith has little to contribute to it. It
keeps one in ignorance rather than enlightens, and it divides rather than unites.
Reason is a much better guide, and is for Meslier (2009, 586-7) the best guide
for moral behavior. And what reason teaches us, Meslier further claims to put
a final nail in the coffin of Christian morals, is that even if we were to return
to the maxim of Christ, purified from the negative influence of his followers
and the Church, we would not find a moral doctrine in line with social utility.
Christianity in its purest form, which blesses the poor and the persecuted, ide-
alises suffering whilst it denies the pleasures of this world.This goes against the
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utilitarian arguments that are underlying Meslier’s ethical reasoning: pleasures
should not be avoided when they create no subsequent pain. Christianity has
a superstitious attitude towards the pleasures of the flesh, once again contra-
dicting Meslier’s underlying utilitarian thought. Lastly, even the maxim to love
one’s enemies, for Meslier, is against rational morals. Not resisting evil leads to
passivity, idleness, and uselessness. It leads to injustice and no society would
survive without some sense that justice is being rendered. These three critiques
of the purest forms of Christianity, based on its cultivation of suffering, aver-
sion for sexual pleasures, and inversion of justice, illustrate the radical critique
that Meslier had proposed of religion. And many of these arguments, though
certainly not all, were accepted by his readers throughout the 18ᵗʰ century, in-
cluding many who were critical of his conclusion: that there is no God.
3. Atheism
Meslier’s atheism was so radical that Voltaire felt compelled to hide it when
he published his Extrait of Meslier’s works. Purged from the “poison of athe-
ism”,¹ the curé’s work could thus be used by Voltaire in his struggle against
l’infâme.This injustice needs to be remedied, andMeslier’s anti-religious thought
read in the light of a positive doctrine of atheism. The portrayal of atheism as
a parasitic doctrine, as Michael Buckley’s (1990) thesis goes, is unconvincing as
it is does not take the arguments of self-avowed atheists seriously enough. One
needs to read past the negation of belief in God in order to understand atheistic
claims.
Meslier’s negation of religious belief can best be summarised by his use of
two neologisms: christicoles and emphdéicoles—and their fusion into the word
déichristicoles. The first term (christicoles) refers to the ‘adorers of Christ’, from
the Latin—a term used by non-Christians to pejoratively refer to them in the
ancient world. Déicole, on the other hand, is usually a positive term, and is a
synonym of theist. It is not a term imposed by one’s adversaries, but a term
claimed by those who render a cult to God.² For Meslier, however, this use is
¹ Letter from Voltaire to the Prince of Brunswick, reproduced in Meslier (1970, 3:487).
² See the respective entries in Littré (1874).
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turned around, no longer signifying the cult of the correct God, but every cult
of a god or goddess, including pagan cults rejected by Christianity. The Christ-
cultists and God-cultists, as Michael Shreve translates the terms (Meslier 2009,
349-351), are fused into the déichristicoles, the GodChrist-cultists (Meslier 2009,
221): those who adore Christ as their God. Meslier is already far from being a
theist, but similar critiques could have been put forward by either a sceptic, a
deist or a pantheist.
Meslier’s subtitle for his Memoir is clear: he seeks to show Clear and Evident
Proofs of the Vanity and Falsity of All the Divinities and of All the Religions of
the World (Meslier 2009, 5). He knows full well that he will be called an atheist
but claims that “it will not bother me in the least” (Meslier 2009, 43). This is sig-
nificant given the seriousness of the accusation in his day, what happened to
Vanini, that ”famous atheist” as Meslier notes (2009, 343), tortured and burnt at
the stake in Toulouse—despite his repudiation of atheism. Meslier, furthermore,
rejects the accusation of impiety—which he associates with bad morals—while
he embraces the atheistic position. Meslier’s seventh proof clearly and unam-
biguously states his atheism: “there is no such being, i.e., there is no God” (2009,
341). The statement is reiterated throughout the seventh and eighth proofs (the
ones Voltaire has cut out from his edition), as well as in the Anti-Fénelon. Yet
Meslier’s list of unorthodox religious thinkers is too vague to be of much help
for defining atheism. He cites Socrates, Aristotle, Plato, Diagoras, Pythagoras,
Vanini, Theodorus, Jozias, Aetius, Averroës, Pline, Tribonian, Lucian, Rabelais,
Spinoza, the popes Julius III and Leo X, as well as Philippe, duke of Orleans
and Regent of France until 1723. Meslier, in other words, is unaware of his own
originality. He does not know that he is formulating, for the first time, a theory
of self-avowed atheism that none of these thinkers had developed themselves.
One needs to piece together the allusions to atheists in Meslier and the dif-
ferences between that position and other unorthodox religious beliefs. Both
atheists and god-cultists agree, he says, that there is infinity. However, they
disagree on what that infinity is. “[T]he god-cultists call it ‘God’ and that athe-
ists call it ‘Nature’ or ‘material being’ or simply ‘matter’” (Meslier 2009, 382).
Meslier’s atheism is thus a materialist doctrine, where matter possesses move-
ment within itself and no longer needs to receive it from an immaterial being.
The debate of the time was about the possibility of moving, but also of thinking
matter. His contrast with the theist position is clear, but so is a contrast with a
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deist position. Matter does not need a prime mover, an intelligent architect or
designer. It moves itself and is capable, on its own, of producing thought.
So much for the materialist doctrine—it remains to be seen what is atheistic
about Meslier’s thought. There are three categories of ‘deniers’ or ‘doubters’ of
the existence of God according to Meslier. There are 1) those who have never
known divinities, 2) those who have called it into question, and 3) those who
have denied it completely (Meslier 2009, 343-4). Simplifying, we could call them
1) primitive atheists, 2) sceptics (one is tempted to use the anachronism ‘agnos-
tics’), and 3) complete atheists (paraphrasing the accusation brought against
Socrates at his trial—τό παράπαν άθεος). Meslier’s categorisation is indeed an
expression, avant la lettre of a complex typology of religious disbelief.
Yet the above arguments are compatible with a pantheistic position à la
Spinoza. One needs to go into the Anti-Fénelon to find the clearest contrast be-
tween Meslier and this position. Meslier’s critique of Fénelon establishes that
the pantheist position cannot be so easily dismissed. For if God exists without
being anything in particular, as Fénelon claims, Meslier says that “it must be
either everything that is, or nothing at all” (Meslier 1970, 3:318; my translation).
To rephrase this in terms that are not his: the God hypothesis can be answered
in one of two ways: either the pantheist answer—everything is God—or the
atheist answer—God is nothing. A few pages later, Meslier writes that atheism
“is certain” (2009, 337), and dismisses conceptions of infinity and substance that
seek to define matter as perfect (Meslier 2009, 325). The pantheist alternative is
dismissed, certainly unfairly as no arguments are given beyond this vague cri-
tique of perfection. But Meslier’s refusal of the Spinozist alternative is not done
against Spinoza’s text, it is done against a Cartesian’s critique of Spinoza. Mes-
lier, it seems, had never read the famous radical Dutch philosopher directly, and
his defense of atheism contra Spinoza remains unconvincing because of this.
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4. Cartesianism
Meslier’s radical reading of Cartesian philosophers has led some commenta-
tors to label him an ‘extreme-leftMalebranchist’, in thewords of his 20ᵗʰ-century
editor (Meslier 1970, 1:lxxxviii). In many ways, Meslier remains indebted to
Cartesian philosophy. He lacks the conceptual tools to free himself from clear
and distinct ideas, for example, or from the speculation about howmattermoves
in ‘whirlwind’ motions. What is most relevant here is to look at the differences
between Meslier and Cartesians. The main difference remains that Meslier is
that he is a materialist and an atheist—and his critiques of Descartes, Fénelon,
and Malebranche are focused on those two aspects.
As Deprun notes, Meslier remains indebted to the system of Descartes. Mes-
lier’s references to Cartesian philosophywere through theworks ofMalebranche
and Fénelon. Despite his criticism of them, Cartesians remain “themost sensible
among déicole philosophers” for Meslier (1970, 1:lxxxviii, my translation), and
there are numerous areas where he accepts the Cartesian method and philoso-
phy. But he never does so uncritically. He accepts the conclusion that one can
demonstrate the existence of a being of which we have a clear and distinct idea
but refuses that this applies to God (Meslier 1970, 375). He accepts that clear and
distinct ideas can make us demonstrate a triple infinity: spatial, temporal and
numerical infinities (Buckley 1990, 269), but he refuses to accept that infinity
proves anything beyond infinite matter. Meslier turns Cartesianism against it-
self, refusing to accept its dualism in favour of a purely material explanation—a
materialist monism, if such Spinozist echoes are appropriate.
One passage best illustrates the indebtedness that Meslier can never free him-
self from when it comes to Cartesian philosophy. Clear and distinct ideas, Mes-
lier concedes, are independent from material reality. “We can even say that
truth, generally speaking, is so independent of everything we can think or imag-
ine that although there be no body or mind, no form or matter, no creator or
creature, even not a thing in the world, there would still at least be a truth be-
cause in this case, it would be true that there was nothing” (Meslier 1970, 380).
The ambiguity that this poses for the materialist philosopher is clear: he needs
to concede that we have clear and distinct ideas of truth, even if that truthwould
be a lack of matter. Later materialist philosophers such as Holbach or Diderot,
building on the sensualism of Locke will side-step this issue, but Meslier, with
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the strong links to Cartesian method, is unable to provide a thorough critique
of this conception of truth (Holbach [1770] 1999, 214).
What Meslier manages to do, in contradiction with Cartesian philosophy, is
to argue convincingly (from within the bounds of his natural philosophy) that
matter is not created, but that it has existed forever. Against Descartes’ cogito,
that seeks to explain existence from thought, Meslier formulates his own cogito.
Our thoughts, he argues, are mere modifications of matter. They cannot prove
the existence of the world around us, but various ways of being, on the other
hand, show that matter can think (Meslier 2009, 538). Various modifications of
matter, in particular animals, show that they have sensations, and most impor-
tantly feel pleasure and pain. Against “gentlemen Cartesians” who speculate
that animals have no soul and thus feel nothing, Meslier opposes the wisdom
of peasants who understand that other material beings are just as capable of
feeling. We no longer have the ‘I think therefore I am’ of Descartes, but we
have the ‘I am therefore I think’ of Meslier—and animals are the key to un-
derstanding our relation to being in general. The Cartesian heritage is thinner
already.
A parenthesis on Meslier’s defence of animal rights illustrates the radical na-
ture of his thought. There is a material equality between men and animals for
Meslier, in that they are composed of the same bodily organs than us, meaning
that “all animals are capable of knowledge and feeling like us” (Meslier 2009,
553). If equality between human beings is based on similar capacities and ma-
terial needs, as we saw above, then there is no good reason to exclude animals
from some form of basic equality. It is a direct consequence of his materialist
ontology that leads Meslier to this conclusion. Since matter is capable of mov-
ing itself, and additionally of thought through particular modifications located
in the brain, it is clear that animals with brains are capable of thought. The
Cartesians, who deny animal knowledge, but also the capacity for sensation—
pleasure and pain—“are obviously ridiculous” for Meslier (2009, 558). Animals
are not the “pure machines” (Meslier 2009, 559) of Cartesians, since they are ca-
pable of sentiments, knowledge, since they possess a language, are capable of
sociability, love, hatred, happiness, fear, etc. Instead of our “feelings of gentle-
ness, kindness, compassion” towards animals, such philosophical speculation
justifies the most vicious of behaviors against our animal companions (Meslier
2009, 562). Railing against the practice of cat-burning, still practiced in his time,
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Meslier (2009, 563) attacks these “brutal, cruel, and detestable” pleasures. Such
cruelty against animals leads to vices in those that perform and witness the cru-
elty against living beings, and as such it enters Meslier’s moral critique. Meslier
phrases it in terms of injustice and is clear that his criteria for justice (natural
equity, personal merit, and punishment of injustice), apply in this case. It is be-
cause of our equal capacity to feel pleasure and pain because animals are often
useful to our life and work that any injustice against them should be punished:
“cursed be the nations who treat them cruelly, who tyrannize them, who love
to spill their blood and who are hungry for their flesh” (Meslier 2009, 146). Al-
though not a vegetarian himself, Meslier clearly defends the position here. The
only reason he gives for not being one himself is that he is not “superstitious or
inclined to the bigotry of religion”, otherwise he “would have surely joined the
party of those who make it a religion to never kill innocent beasts and never eat
their flesh” (Meslier 2009, 146-7).The deontological interdiction is too strong for
the consequentialist thinker: surely there are times when eating animal’s flesh
satisfies his criteria of justice. Nonetheless, he clarifies that he had “never done
anything with so much repugnance” as to have an animal killed for his food
(Meslier 2009, 146).
Meslier did not have access to Spinoza’s work as Geneviève Artigas-Menant
(2013) notes, and does not cite Bayle directly, though many of his arguments
reproduce Bayle’s work leadingMori (2000) to conclude that the relationship be-
tween Meslier and Bayle is “purely contextual”. Bayle meant something quite
different from Meslier, however, when he spoke of atheism. As Israel shows,
Bayle “defines ‘atheism’ to mean denial of divine Providence and reward and
punishment in the hereafter” (Israel 2001, 9). We are far from the complete athe-
ism of Meslier! But Bayle had argued that atheists can be virtuous, just as much
as Christians can be vicious. Bayle argues that the field of moral worth is in-
dependent from that of belief, an argument that Meslier accepts and develops.
Although he is happy to accept the label of the ‘atheist’, Meslier is not content
to be called ‘impious’ [impie]. The latter label, for him, signifies the iniquities
and injustices done by one person on another. Whereas atheism is based on a
materialist concept of being which includes a natural moral duty to take into
account the pleasure and pain of others, the impious is the one that treats oth-
ers unjustly. The divorce between these terms follows the distinction made by
Bayle. The virtuous atheist is no longer a theoretical possibility, he is mate-
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rialised in the figure of Jean Meslier himself, who sought to rid the world of
some of its injustices.
5. Proto­utility
Meslier’s radical thought is dominated by an attack on the inequalities be-
tween the different États of the Ancien Régime. The kleptocratic alliance be-
tween nobles and priests reflects the domination of the populace by a powerful
minority in his time. Meslier’s thought is certainly grounded in an appeal to
equality but phrased in terms of justice and utility. It is the injustice arising
from the gross inequalities that anger the curé, and in particular when the least
useful of society seem to benefit the most. References to utility are rampant
throughout the Memoir, and best illustrated by two sections of the sixth proof.
Sections 44 and 45 have unfortunately lost somewhat of their utilitarian twist
in Shreve’s translation. Whilst the French text is clearly proto-utilitarian, using
variations of utility thirteen times in three pages, the English translator’s use
of variations of the word ‘useful’ loses that theoretical edge.¹ In section 44, it is
the rich and the privileged that attract Meslier’s wrath. There are the ones who
“trample, pillage, and oppress the people”, whether they are noble themselves
or accomplices to the rule of the nobility, who live from their rents and annual
incomes. Those who are of no utility [d’aucune utilité], “they must necessarily
be a public burden since they only live off the work of others” and must be
“severely punished” (Meslier 2009, 281-2). For one’s utility to fellow-citizens is
clearly the criterion, for Meslier, of justice. Section 45 makes this abundantly
clear. Bishops, priests, and vicars are useless in their theological functions, but
they have a clear utility when it comes to teaching the moral virtues. If only
they were to give up their useless functions, they could focus on their role as
moral educators. There is hope, thus, for the utility of the clergy in Meslier’s
thought. There is a role for them in a just republic, but their role will be sig-
nificantly redefined. Since all must share equally in various types of work, and
since there is utility in work of the body and mind [util travail du corp ou de
¹ Variations in French include utilité (6 times), inutilement (twice), utilement, utile(s) (3 times) and
inutiles (Meslier 1970, 2:29-32). For the English translation, see Meslier (2009, 281-3).
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l’esprit], a certain spiritual dimension—albeit understood within Meslier’s ma-
terialist framework—is not excluded (Meslier 1970, 2:74; 2009, 303). Utility is
central, but not yet understood in terms of a utilitarian calculus of various ac-
tions, as it includes the works of the body and esprit that are beneficial to the
social body. Whilst Meslier’s utilitarian arguments remain relatively undevel-
oped, they do occupy a central place in his conception of justice, and his insis-
tence on the utility of social work has been instrumental in his reception in the
20ᵗʰ century by communist authors, as we will see.
What this proto-utilitarian grounding for ethics does is to continue in the
line of argument present in Bayle, and to give it another direction than Bayle’s
ultimate return to faith. Morality is not based on one’s beliefs, creed, or lack
thereof. Morality is based on tangible virtues in human beings. All human be-
ings, whether they are Christian, Muslim, Jews, or atheists, are thus capable of
virtuous behavior. Utility is a means to ground a conception of morality in a
principle even more tangible, as it is at least observable through the medium of
work. And the model is as radical as it gets in the Ancien Régime, a social struc-
ture still based on aristocratic principles of inheritance. While Meslier may fail
to convince that utility provides the sure foundation for morality he thought
he had found, it does propose an egalitarian means of promoting social justice.
6. Political thought
In manyways, Meslier’s political thought is an extension of his anti-religious,
materialist, and atheist philosophy. Meslier struggles to establish clear lines of
difference between his critique of religion and politics, and he certainly gener-
alises tremendously. There is a little more subtlety when it comes to the role
of the priesthood, as we have just seen, whose members may be salvaged be-
cause of their social utility. But only those who have proven their utility to their
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parishioners are included here, which excludes the useless upper clergy. When
it comes to political rulers, Meslier’s anti-monarchical thought is (almost) un-
equivocal. The tyrants of the earth are his targets, accompanied by their legions
of servants. Most importantly, it seems that Meslier has inherited La Boétie’s
critique—though again he most likely did not read the text directly. The lat-
ter’s famous Discourse on voluntary servitude finds echoes in Meslier’s work. La
Boétie had argued that “A people enslaves itself, cuts its own throat, when, hav-
ing achoice between being vassals and being freemen, it deserts its liberties and
takes on the yoke, gives consent to its own misery, or, rather, apparently wel-
comes it” (La Boétie [1576] 1997, 44). As for Meslier, he repeats this argument
by saying that “It is only from the people (whom they care so little about) that
they get all their grandeur, riches, and power. In a word, they would be noth-
ing but weak, little men like you if you did not support their grandeur” (Meslier
2009, 304).The kings, or rather the tyrants that rule over people, are the summit
of this pyramid of injustice in Meslier’s thought. They are tyrants everywhere
and provide little utility to their citizens. The injustice of this stratified social
structure bears close resemblance to the model of a tyrannical, all-powerful
God promoted by the kleptocratic alliance. Believing in an all-powerful God,
for Meslier, is the first step towards accepting tyrannical rule. It is, for him, a
logical consequence of his materialism and atheism that there should be a more
equal set of social relations, since the current order is based on false hypothesis
of absolute rule—by God or the king. Meslier even goes as far as to promote
tyrannicide. Meslier particularly praises this practice of the ancients as an act
of courage and devotion to the common good. Against the cowardice of his con-
temporaries, who merely suffer injustices rather than resist them, according to
themaxim of Christ, he advocates for a return tomore spirited acts of resistance.
Meslier does not hesitate to place Ravaillac, murder of Henri IV and perceived
as a religious fanatic even in Meslier’s time, among those who have freed peo-
ples of earth from tyrannical dominations. Meslier’s preaching style is apparent
here, as in so many other places in the Memoir, and the message is crystal clear.
The injustice of tyrants needs to be resisted, by whatever means possible. He
is even willing to put aside religious differences to support those who act for
social utility. And killing the tyrant does not suffice. It is widespread revolu-
tion that is being advocated by Meslier. Domination needs to be overthrown,
by violent means if necessary. The Memoir’s conclusion is crystal clear on this:
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Work to unite all of you, as many as you are, you and your fellow men, to completely
shake off the yoke of the tyrannical domination of your kings and princes. Overthrow
the thrones of injustice and impiety everywhere! Break all the crowned heads! (Meslier
2009, 581)
One does not get much more radical than that.
As such, fears by anti-atheist polemicists have come to materialise them-
selves. It turns out that challenging the existence of God does lead—at least
in Meslier—to a threat to political authority—including the threat of death and
revolution. Of course, this is not necessarily the case, as others will either de-
velop apolitical consequences of their disbelief—such as La Mettrie—or have
much milder political consequences in mind—such as Holbach. But for Meslier
the complete and utter revolution of social structures is a direct consequence of
his atheism. Once one has broken the Divine hierarchy, one breaks the Church’s
hierarchy and political domination to create a free and equal society based on
shared work aimed at common utility.
7. Communism
It is of little wonder, thus, thatMeslier has been co-opted bymany communist
authors; or that he was accused of communism by others. Maurice Dommanget
is the clearest defender of this hypothesis. Himself a French syndicalist and au-
thor of many books on revolutionary figures, his interest in Meslier’s radical
political thought is of no surprise. The subtitle of his book, athée, communiste
et révolutionnaire sous Louis XIV, points out the radical nature of his thought
(Dommanget 1965). Of course, one needs to be very careful of anachronisms,
and the label of ‘communist’ is not easily applied to the curé. Dommanget fur-
ther claims that Meslier’s atheism is only secondary to his communism, as the
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social critique takes precedence over the theological and philosophical concerns.
Meslier, for Dommanget, is no less than a precursor to Marx and Engels’ Com-
munist Manifesto. He has invented the theory of the general strike (Dommanget
1965, 299). Meslier is “an ancestor of revolutionary socialism and of commu-
nism” (1965, 7), his Memoir is a socialist and revolutionary programme (1965,
105), Meslier formulates a communist theory with the village or the parish at
its centre, and Meslier caries the flag of ideological communism (1965, 346).
Dommanget’s own analysis, though, finds some contradictions between Mes-
lier’s political thought and Marx’s. Meslier’s socialism is not yet “scientific” but
no longer “utopian” (1965, 273), Meslier—unlike Marx—is concerned with the
agrarian class (1965, 281); he defends a role for the priesthood (1965, 316); and he
nowhere addresses the problems of equality of women or of “people of colour”
(1965, 350). Dommanget, in other words, is at pains to reconcile his own bias
with the works of Meslier, and Dommanget’s anachronistic labelling is a prob-
lem even within his own framework.
But the label stuck, as it is used by most commentators since. Jean Deprun,
Roland Desné, and Albert Soboul, the three editors of Meslier’s complete works,
defend a similar thesis. A little more nuanced than Dommanget, they see Mes-
lier’s communism as “cosubstantial with his atheism” (Meslier 1970, 1:ci), and
thus no longer primary. But it is not less teleological in their analysis, as in it
“the perspective is already open which, linking communism with materialism,
will end up with Marx” (Meslier 1970, 1:ci). Luciano Verona (1975) continues
with this thesis, changing only slightly the terminology to call Meslier a “rev-
olutionary socialist” who had “revolutionary clairvoyance”, and many of the
passages of the Memoir “presage Karl Marx”. More recently, Geneviève Moëne,
Alain Sandrier, Michel Onfray, Miguel Benítez, and Serge Deruette have taken
up this label, with only minor qualifications. For Moëne (2003, 114) it is a “rural
communism”, for Sandrier (2004, 64) a “violent communism”, for Deruette (2008,
30) “the first atheist communist”, for Benítez (2012, 94) he is a communist who
“universalises work”, and for Onfray (2006, 5) he is a “political communalist”.
Despite the anachronism, there are good reasons why this label has survived in
the literature.
It is Meslier’s universalisation of work that has been instrumental in his re-
ception in the 20ᵗʰ century. The sixth proof, discussing the roots of tyranny,
provides a list of “abuses” that the Christian religion tolerates. The first abuse
2 : 16 Charles Devellennes
sets the ground for the uncompromising theory of equality that Meslier pur-
ports: “All men are equal by nature; they all hold equally the right to live and
to walk upon the earth, the right to enjoy their natural liberty and to share in
the goods of the land, with everyone working usefully to have the things that
are necessary and useful in life” (Meslier 2009, 273).
Meslier qualifies this uncompromising equality—as I will later show—but it
nonetheless serves as a basis for the entire sixth proof—if not the Memoir as a
whole. The first abuse, then, is that Christianity has allowed for a “huge dispro-
portion” between persons—some born to be masters, some to be slaves. Mes-
lier’s alternative is clear: natural equality and liberty are incompatible with
the existing inequalities of the Ancien Régime, and with any other kind of pro-
nounced inegalitarian social structure. Once again, it is the nobility and the
clergy that form the brunt of the social critique. The hierarchical structure justi-
fied under aristocratic principles is critiqued for its vicious genealogy; “a crim-
inal and fateful birth and source” (Meslier 2009, 277). And the Christian reli-
gion is not only passively culpable, for Meslier, but actively promotes similar
principles among its own ranks. The monastic orders are pointed out as the
culmination of this ethic of uselessness [inutilité], as highlighted above, which
Meslier so forceful disapproves of. The hypocrisy of the monastic orders is all-
the-more shocking, as they collectively possess great wealth despite their indi-
vidual vows of poverty. Such practices, tolerated and actively promoted by the
Catholic Church, lead to great inequalities, which for Meslier are so contrary
to natural justice. A just society cannot emerge when these social classes (the
“disproportion of the state and conditions of men”, Meslier 2009, 273) persist.
Justice can only be reached when all work together towards the common good,
not when some are exempt from this requirement by appeals to ancient or spir-
itual privileges.
It is in the third abuse of the sixth proof that one finds another argument in
favor of Meslier’s early ‘communism’. It is a thorough critique of the “individ-
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ual appropriation that men make of the goods and riches of the land, instead of,
as they should, possessing them in common” (Meslier 2009, 295). This critique
of private ownership of land—the primary means of production in Meslier’s
time—clearly possesses radical potential. The organisation of such an economic
system is even spelled out, if only in schematic terms. Men and women will
unite, Meslier says, according to territorial units of proximity (“a city, town, vil-
lage, or parish and community”, Meslier 2009, 295) where they will all regard
one another as “brothers and sisters” and conclude alliances with neighbour-
ing communities. This, Meslier speculates, will allow them to have “the same
or similar food and being all equally well clothed, well housed, well bedded,
and well heated, and applying themselves also equally to the labor, i.e., to the
work or to some honest and useful job” (Meslier 2009, 295). This ideal of small,
autonomous communities collaborating with one another where shared work
forms the principle of the association and material well-being the goal is indeed
not far removed from a form of early communism. The models Meslier has in
mind are—ironically—the form of the early communities of Christians, or the
organisation promoted in monastic orders (Meslier 2009, 309-11). Meslier in-
terprets the “communion of saints” to mean the common ownership of goods
among these early Christians, but the model has been corrupted and largely
destroyed. Even its monastic incarnation renders monks unhappy because of
its attitude to the pleasures of the flesh. The early Christian communities may
point the way to the possibilities of common ownership, but they are not a
model worth following. But the “people”, Meslier claims, could do better than
the monks. They could build “solid houses to live in comfortably with their
flocks”, “construct pleasant, useful gardens and orchards”, “carefully cultivate
the land”, and “obtain everywhere an abundance of all goods” (Meslier 2009,
311). The agrarian ideal of common ownership is the only one that Meslier can
conceive of—unsurprisingly given his context.
What this critique of private property and defence of common ownership
points out, as many commentators highlight, is Meslier’s materialist philoso-
phy. Meslier’s materialist conception of nature—with matter being capable of
movement and of thought, has direct consequences for his political thought. It
is, after all, thematerial conditions of the people thatMeslier was worried about.
Feeding, housing, heating, and working conditions are explicitly mentioned. It
follows that if matter is capable of thought, it certainly needs particular mate-
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rial conditions to do so. Without access to these basic goods, human beings are
not capable of personal development. Since the political conditions of the An-
cien Régime tolerate and promote inequalities that prevent many people from
having these basic goods, it no longer fulfills the conditions of the materialist
philosophy of Meslier.
Given this unjust political order, resistance is justified. Tyrannicide is not
excluded, as we have seen, but resistance is much wider than this single act of
political violence. Deruette, following Dommanget, hypothesises that Meslier
is the first to come up with a “theory of the general strike as a revolutionary
weapon” (Dommanget 1965, 299; Deruette 2008, 31). This is certainly an over-
statement, but Meslier does theorise the link between the work of the people
and the power of their masters. “For, it is only from the fruit of your hard work
that all these people live” (Meslier 2009, 304). Power is conceptualised much
more subtly in this sixth proof than it had been earlier in the Memoir. The so-
called power the greatest prince is entirely dependent on thework of the people:
“they would not have more power or authority than you if you did not want to
submit to their laws and will” (Meslier 2009, 304). Combined with the conclud-
ing thoughts of theMemoir, whereMeslier shames those who “cowardly submit
themselves to unjust laws” (Meslier 2009, 581), the revolutionary potential of
his thought is complete. But it is La Boétie ([1576] 1997), rather than Meslier,
who had formulated this idea in the first instance. His Discourse on Voluntary
Servitude had made the argument that it is the people themselves who are re-
sponsible for their own misery, since they so easily submit to the will of their
masters and take for natural a condition that is only social.
8. Radical republicanism
Meslier’s radical political thought does promote a certain conception of a
just republic, over and above the arguments discussed above. Israel’s frame-
work of the radical Enlightenment, built on the values of universality, equality,
and democracy, is an excellent fit for Meslier’s thought. Yet as Israel notes, if
Meslier is highly critical of the wide inequalities of the Ancien Régime, he is
not against all forms of inequality (Israel 2006, 555). Just after having declared
the fundamental equality of all men cited above, Meslier adds: “But since they
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live in society and since a society or community of men cannot be ruled well or
maintained in good order without some kind of dependence and subordination
between them, it is absolutely necessary for the good of human society that
there be some kind of dependence and subordination among them” (Meslier
2009, 273).
This subordination, Meslier continues, “should be just andwell proportioned”
(Meslier 2009, 274), even if the precise terms of this just inequality is never fully
discussed. In the conclusion, Meslier adds that his contemporaries will only be
happy when delivered from tyranny and superstition, and “governed only by
good and wise magistrates” (Meslier 2009, 582). There are some who deserve
to rule over others, as magistrates, based upon their personal merit and virtue.
It is, Meslier further states, those with an even better knowledge of injustices
than he has who should be entrusted with the ruling of such a republic (Meslier
2009, 590). The institutional discussion is inexistent, but the message is clear:
political power has only one basis, and that is to contribute to the preservation
of a sense of justice in the republic.
In the absence of Divine justice, Meslier attempted to find grounds for earthly
justice. His conception of justice can be broken down in three different parts:
natural equity, personal merit, and punishment of injustice. Of these three, the
topic of natural equity has already been discussed above and is the basis of his
critique of the social classes of his time, as well as his defence of the equal shar-
ing of work by all. Meslier had vehemently protested against miracles in the
second proof on the ground that it favors certain peoples over others. These
“exceptions of peoples” are rejected by Meslier on the ground that they would
be fundamentally unjust, since they apply with complete disregard for personal
merit, judging entire peoples simultaneously (Meslier 2009, 116). Any sense of
justice needs to incorporate this sense of merit, to promote virtue and deter
vice. It is the worldly concerns of a moral education that drive Meslier to this
conclusion. The same reason that had led him to defend a role for the clergy in
terms of moral and spiritual education of the populace leads him to formulate
a general theory of justice. Since we cannot expect this justice to come on its
own, it needs to be enacted by the judges and magistrates of the republic. These
magistrates, “who were established to suppress vices, to maintain justice and
good order everywhere, and to severely punish the guilty and wicked, do not
dare to do anything about the vices and injustices of kings” (Meslier 2009, 335).
2 : 20 Charles Devellennes
It is the ability to hold those in power accountable for their actions that makes
a just republic. This implies that injustice is worthy of punishment. Not only
is it just to discourage vicious behavior, but it is also just to punish those who
practice injustice. Against the Christian conception of forgiveness and turning
the other cheek, Meslier defends the necessity of retributive justice. The very
figure of Christ, the innocent who pays for the crime of the guilty, is against
Meslier’s conception of justice. Christianity has thus inverted natural justice,
but permitting “so many evils, vices, and wickedness for the greatest manifes-
tation of [God’s] glory, power, justice, and mercy” (Meslier 2009, 530). Human
justice may be imperfect and flawed, it may require retribution, but it has better
consequences than Divine justice.
It is ultimately a defence of a consequentialist approach to politics and moral-
ity that is defended by Meslier, both in his proto-utilitarian doctrine, and in his
radical republican ideals. His “three principal errors of Christianmorality” (Mes-
lier 2009, 263) point this direction. Christianity’s pursuit of pain and suffering,
its condemnation of the pleasures of the flesh, and its pursuit of non-resistance
to evil, are attacked for their negative consequences on human happiness. “We
cannot deny that pain and suffering, hunger and thirst, harm and persecution
are contrary to Nature”, Meslier claims (2009, 264). The “greatest good and hap-
piness of man” cannot rest in this principle. But Meslier goes further. Even
Christianity’s morality attempts to justify itself according to these consequen-
tialist principles, when it claims that rewards will be enjoyed in heaven. Mes-
lier rejects the reality of the rewards, not the consequentialist principle utilised.
Meslier rejects Christianity’s condemnation of the pleasures of the flesh, though
it is not to say, that they are always good. “I am not, however, saying this to
approve of or favor in any way the debauchery of men and women who would
indiscreetly or excessively abandon themselves to this animal inclination, and
I condemn this excess and disorder as well as all other kinds of excess and dis-
order” (Meslier 2009, 266). His critique of Christian non-resistance provides an
additional twist. For Meslier, ‘it is obviously a natural right, natural reason, nat-
ural equality and justice to preserve our life and goods against those who want
to take them from us unjustly’ (Meslier 2009, 267, emphasis added). Despite his
attack on private property illustrated above, Meslier does not disapprove of pri-
vate possessions. It is only just to have what is ours, but it is the consequences
of the wide disproportions of goods that he is critical of. Great inequalities lead
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to the shortage of primary material goods that make a happy life impossible.
That is not to say that resistance is always necessary. There are times when the
consequences of resistance are too harsh, and prudence is warranted (Meslier
2009, 268). Meslier may be defending his own life choices here, as he decided to
resist through his Memoir, not through more radical actions. The consequences
for publishing were radical enough, as the example made of Vanini testifies, and
Meslier was coherent in his moral outlook by refusing to suffer a martyr’s fate.
Despite Meslier’s defense of tyrannicide, he did not advocate for widespread
regicide, because of this consequentialist ethic. It is not the presence of a king
that is the sole reason for a tyranny. Their claims to receive their authority
from privileged—divine—sources play a role in this corruption, as does the ran-
domness of birth coupled with a hereditary throne. Ultimately it is the kings’
lack of interest in their subjects’ happiness that is attacked vehemently. But
there are such things as good princes. Or at least there have been, and Meslier
cite Marcus Aurelius as the exemplar (Meslier 2009, 331). And ultimately it is
a different concept of republic that Meslier is defending here. For the Roman
emperor Antoninus is said to have ruled justly when he stopped paying those
he found “useless to the republic” (Meslier 2009, 292). The republic has to be
understood as the res publica, the public thing, the polity—irrespective of its
particular constitutional arrangements. An empire is a republic, just as much
as the institutions of “the brave Dutch (…) or the Swiss” (Meslier 2009, 584).
Of course, it has to be noted that there are no examples of virtuous princes in
Meslier’s work that are contemporary to his time. Only these brief mentions of
the Dutch and Swiss republics, “who were nobly delivered from tyranny” point
towards a model of rule that Meslier approves of in his time.
9. Conclusion
There are good grounds to resist the grand historiographical move of Israel.
The dichotomy he proposes, between radical and moderate Enlightenments, is
not a steadfast categorisation (even in his work), and many critics have shown
that some of the ‘moderate’ Enlightenment is more radical than Israel allows.
Yet the dichotomy manages to illustrate two important poles of thought over
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a century and a half of European thought. There are few thinkers, apart per-
haps Spinoza himself, who better fit Israel’s idea of the radical Enlightenment
than Meslier does. The accusation of Spinozism, a synonym of atheism, is one
of Meslier’s most radical arguments. Indeed, one might argue that he is even
more radical than Spinoza here, since he claims atheism as his own. There are
of course important nuances to this picture. Meslier is much more indebted
to Cartesian thought than Israel’s framework allows for. Meslier had not read
Spinoza, despite a couple of mentions of his name in his work. He had inherited
his Spinozism second-hand. But Meslier did not hesitate to radicalise Bayle’s
arguments even further. His inversion of Christian morals is a particular tes-
tament to this. This article, which details Meslier’s political thought, concludes
that Israel’s framework is helpful in re-conceptualising the curé’s works not as
that of an early communist or a forerunner of Marx, but as a formulation of
early theory of radical republicanism, rooted in Enlightenment conceptions of
materialism. Other French materialists such as Holbach and Diderot will come
to different conclusions than Meslier, but the label of radical Enlightener will
find no better match than Meslier’s cogitations.
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